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Online Constraint Satisfaction via Tolls in MDP
Congestion Games
Sarah H. Q. Li, Yue Yu, Dan Calderone, Lillian J. Ratliff and Behçet Açıkmes¸e
Abstract— We consider the toll design problem that arise
for a game designer of a congested stochastic network
when the decision makers are myopically updating their
strategies based on current system state. If both the de-
signer and the decision makers are adaptively searching for
an optimal strategy, it is not clear how and if both parties
can attain their optimal strategies. We formulate the toll
synthesis problem of inducing an equilibrium distribution
that satisfies a given set of design specifications as a
bilevel optimization, in which the lower level consists of
decision makers playing an Markov decision process (MDP)
congestion game. In addition to showing the existence of
an optimal tolling threshold, we formulate learning algo-
rithms that can be employed by both the game designer
and the players to jointly determine the optimal toll and
induced equilibrium, respectively, and analyze its conver-
gence properties.
Index Terms— Incentive design, Markov decision pro-
cess, congestion games
I. INTRODUCTION
In many large-scale networks with self-motivated users,
competition for network resources induces congestion effects
and directly couples individual users’ decisions. However,
aided by widespread technological advances [1], decision
makers now may adaptively optimize their strategies given the
plethora of information on states of the network with which
they interact [2]. Knowing such behaviour, a system designer
may choose to enforce tolls on the optimal-seeking decision
makers to satisfy system objectives. For example, for a ride-
share company whose drivers seek to maximize their earnings,
the company may impose monetary penalties on drivers who
roam in suburban neighbourhoods to reduce traffic noise
and promote residential well-being. Equivalently, monetary
incentives may be given to drivers in commercial areas where
large ride-share demands exist, but are not attractive enough
to drivers due to their highly congested traffic.
This paper considers the design of optimal tolls which may
be imposed on a stochastic system that experiences congestion
to achieve a set of design specifications in an online setting.
We model such systems as an MDP congestion game [3]
played by a continuous population of decision makers. We
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formulate the toll synthesis problem from the perspective of a
game designer who does not necessarily know the objectives
of individual decision makers a priori. By stating the game de-
signer’s objective as a bilevel optimization, we devise learning
algorithms for both the designer and the decision makers, such
that both the optimal toll and the induced optimal strategies
can be simultaneously achieved.
Our analysis utilizes the MDP congestion game model [3],
which is a class of non-cooperative games where decision
makers solve an MDP with congestion effects embedded in its
cost structure—i.e. the cost of a state-action pair depends on
the population of decision makers who choose that state-action
pair. In such a game, an MDP Wardrop equilibrium exists if
the MDP cost functions are non-decreasing. The equilibrium
is optimal for all decision makers as they cannot achieve a
lower expected cost by optimizing their strategies [4, 3].
When the MDP Wardrop equilibrium is not unique, conver-
gence to an optimal strategy is non-trivial and requires coordi-
nation between decision makers [5]. One form of coordination
is realized when decision makers adapt their strategy profile
based on the history of other players’ strategies. We interpret
this adaptive behaviour as an online learning process, in which
decision makers converge to an MDP Wardrop equilibrium
according to myopic update rules—i.e., decision makers tend
to select actions with the highest return without considering
the effect on congestion in the future.
A. Contributions
Under an online setting, we employ tolls on state-action
costs as a mechanism to ensure that the system level design
specifications are satisfied by the resulting MDP Wardrop
equilibrium. Extending our prior work [6], we formulate tolls
for a more general class of state-action cost functions—ones
that include the limiting case where costs are independent
of population distribution, as in classic MDPs—and show
the existence of optimal toll values whose addition to the
game guarantees the satisfaction of design specifications for a
minimal increase in the cost of playing for decision makers.
When the state-action cost functions of decision makers
are unknown to the game designer, the optimal toll values
cannot be derived explicitly. Hence we consider a scenario
where the game designer must deduce the optimal toll value
by observing and interacting with a group of decision makers.
By incorporating results from constrained traffic assignment
literature [7, 8] with MDP algorithms [9, 10, 11], we formulate
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a myopic toll update based on the population distribution of
decision makers converging to an MDP Wardrop equilibrium.
Under the interactive scenario between game designer and
decision makers, we show that the toll update converges to
the optimal tolling values. In particular, the convergence holds
whether the decision makers themselves are converging to
Wardrop equilibrium exactly or asymptotically.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We summarize
related work in Section II. In Section III, we introduce
preliminaries and background for MDP congestion games.
In Section IV, we consider a tolling method to enforce
affine constraints, and in Section V-A we consider learning
dynamics for the game designer. In Section VI, we present
an implementation of our adaptive tolling method on a ride-
share example, where a central authority utilizes toll updates
to enforce constraints on decision makers who are themselves
following learning dynamics.
II. RELATED WORK
MDP congestion games [3, 12] combine features of non-
atomic routing games [4, 13, 14]— i.e., where decision makers
influence each other’s edge costs through congestion effects
over a network—and stochastic games [15, 16]—i.e., where
each decision maker solves an MDP. MDP Wardrop equilib-
rium for MDP congestion game, akin to Wardrop equilibrium
of routing games, was introduced in [3].
Our approach to satisfying design constraints is similar to
techniques for constraint satisfaction through link cost modi-
fication in non-atomic routing games, which were developed
in [7]. See also [14, Sec. 2.8.2] for a discussion of tolling to
enforce side-constraints and [14, Sec. 2.4] for a discussion of
tolling to improve social welfare in routing games. In [17],
computation of tolls without knowledge of a routing game’s
latency functions is shown to converge in polynomial time.
Despite similarities in our approach, the algorithms developed
in this paper depend on the stochastic dynamics underlying
MDP congestion games, and therefore differ from those in
routing games.
Adaptive incentive design has also been considered in
both deterministic and stochastic settings in [18], and in the
partial information setting [19]. By leveraging our game’s
network structure and specific design objective, we formulate
more explicit algorithms with specific tolling functions. The
sensitivity of Nash equilibria to incentive function parameters
are analyzed in [20] to obtain the effects of incentives on
equilibrium.
Tolling on routing game link costs to satisfy external ob-
jectives can also be interpreted as a Stackelberg game [21]
between a leader and followers, where the followers play a
non-cooperative game whose cost is influenced by the leader’s
actions. Leader action update techniques are developed for
leaders optimizing the social cost of its followers; see [22] for
a recent result.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we present an overview of mathematical
preliminaries relevant to MDP congestion games, including
a numerical method for solving for the game. We use the
notation [K] = {0, . . . ,K − 1} to denote an index set of
length K, R to denote the set of real numbers, and R+ for
the set of positive real numbers including zero. For any tensor
Z ∈ RN1×N2×N3 , we use Zn1n2n3 to denote its components.
To denote a vector of ones of size N , we use 1N . The support
of a vector x = [x1, . . . , xN ], supp(x) is defined to be the set
of indices m ∈ [M ] where xm 6= 0.
A. MDP
In an archetypal finite MDP problem, each decision maker
solves a finite-horizon MDP [23] with horizon of length T ,
finite state space [S] and finite action space [A] given by
min
x
∑
t,s,a
ytsactsa
s.t.
∑
a
y0sa = ps,∀ s ∈ [S],∑
a
yt+1,sa =
∑
s′,a
Ptss′ayts′a, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S],
y ∈ R(T+1)×S×A+ ,
(1)
where the objective is to minimize the total expected cost over
the finite time horizon [T+1]. The optimization variable y de-
fines a time-varying state-action probability distribution, such
that ytsa/
∑
a′∈[A] ytsa′ denotes a decision maker’s probability
of taking action a at state s and time t.
The probability kernel P defines the MDP transition dy-
namics, where Ptss′a denotes the time varying transition
probability from state s′ to s when taking action a. The kernel
P satisfies∑
s′∈[S]
Pts′sa = 1, Pts′sa ≥ 0 ∀ s′, s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A], t ∈ [T ].
Solutions to a finite horizon MDP problem described by (1)
can be obtained using Algorithms 1 and 2 [23]. Algorithm 1
iteratively evaluates the Bellman equation temporally back-
wards to determine the optimal expected cost-to-go, Vts and
the optimal policy, pits, which determines the optimal action
Algorithm 1 Backward Induction
Input: c, P .
Output: pi.
1: for t = T, . . . , 0 do
2: for each s ∈ [S] do
3: if t = T then
4: (Vts, pits) = min
a∈[A]
ctsa
5: else
6: (Vts, pits) = min
a∈[A]
ctsa +
∑
s′∈[S]
Pts′saVt+1,s′
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
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to take at time t and state s. Note the min operator in
Algorithm 1 returns two values: the minimum value of the
input set, assigned to Vts, and the argument of the minimum
value, assigned to pits.
Algorithm 2 Forward Induction
Input: P , p, pi.
Output: x.
1: for t = 0, 1, . . . , T do
2: for each s ∈ [S] do
3: if t = 0 then
4: x0spi0s = ps
5: else
6: xts(pits) =
∑
a∈[A]
∑
s′∈[S]
Pt−1,ss′axt−1,s′a
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
Algorithm 2 propagates an initial probability density p
forward in time to obtain the probability distribution, x, that
results from employing policy pi.
B. MDP Congestion Game
As in non-atomic games [24], we now consider a continuous
population of decision makers each solving a finite horizon
MDP given by (1). The total population distribution is given
by y ∈ R(T+1)×S×A, such that ytsa describes the portion of
total population taking action a at state s and time t. Given
a probability kernel P ∈ RT×S×S×A+ and initial distribution
p ∈ RS+, the set of feasible population distributions Y(P, p)
is described by
Y(P, p) = {y ∈ R(T+1)×S×A+
∣∣∣∑
a
yt+1,sa =
∑
s′,a
Ptss′ayts′a,∑
a
y0sa = ps}.
(2)
We say the population has mass M if
∑
s∈[S] ps = M > 0.
In a non-atomic MDP congestion game, each decision
maker in the total population distribution seeks to minimize
their expected total cost in the finite horizon T . The state-
action cost is given by
ctsa = `tsa(y), (3)
where `tsa : R(T+1)×S×A → R. We use `(y) ∈ R(T+1)×S×A
to denote the cost tensor whose (t, s, a) component is `tsa(y).
When individual decision makers optimize an MDP with
y-dependent state-action costs, an MDP Wardrop equilibrium
is reached if the population cannot achieve a better expected
total cost by choosing a different feasible distribution within
Y(P, p).
Definition 1 (MDP Wardrop Equilibrium [3]): We say a
population distribution y is a MDP Wardrop equilibrium if
it satisfies∑
t,s,a
y?tsa(k)`tsa(y
?) ≤
∑
t,s,a
ytsa`tsa(y
?), ∀ y ∈ Y(P, p)
1) Potential Game Formulation: MDP congestion games are
a subset of potential games [25]. If an explicit potential
function F : R(T+1)×S×A → R exists for `(y), such that
∇yF (y) = `(y), then all solutions of the following optimiza-
tion problem are Wardrop equilibria of the MDP congestion
game corresponding to ` [3]:
W = argmin
ytsa
F (y)
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p).
(4)
In the rest of this paper, we specialize to the case where
`tsa is only a function of ytsa. This allows for an explicit
potential function in the form of an integral. In particular, the
optimization problem given in (4) can be re-formulated as
W = argmin
y
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`tsa(u)∂u
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p).
(5)
We also require `(y) to satisfy a monotonicity, non-decreasing,
property.
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity): For each y′, y ∈ Y(P, p),
y′tsa ≥ ytsa, the (t, s, a) component of state-action cost tensor
`(y) satisfies `tsa(y′tsa) ≥ `tsa(ytsa).
Analogous to the colloquial meaning of congestion, As-
sumption 1 states that the state-action cost for triplet (t, s, a)
cannot decrease as the portion of population that chooses it
increases. A limiting scenario is the classic MDP, in which
`tsa is a constant function of ytsa.
Assumption 1 implies both non-uniqueness of MDP
Wardrop equilibrium and convexity for optimization prob-
lem (5). Non-uniqueness of MDP Wardrop equilibrium can
be readily observed by noting that the optimal solution of an
MDP problem is also not unique in general. Convexity of (5)
allows us to leverage existing convex optimization techniques
to solve MDP congestion games.
C. Frank-Wolfe Algorithm
Although optimization problem (5) is an explicit formula-
tion of the MDP Wardrop equilibrium set and can be solved
numerically, arriving at the same equilibrium requires decision
makers to anticipate each other’s strategies. Coordination be-
tween individual decision makers is difficult even when the set
of decision makers is finite [5]. Additionally, decision makers
themselves may not know the full congestion cost model ` and
may only observe the resulting costs from previous games.
Despite these difficulties, decision makers who perform
myopic updates derived from the Frank-Wolfe algorithm [26]
will achieve asymptotic convergence to MDP Wardrop equilib-
rium [6]. Frank-Wolfe is a gradient-based iterative algorithm
consisting of two steps: 1) compute steepest feasible descent
direction using a linearized objective around current iterate,
and 2) combine a descent direction and current iterate convexly
to produce the next iterate. The full algorithm is given in Algo-
rithm 3. At each iteration, q(yk) =
∑
t,s,a(y
k
tsa−dktsa)`tsa(yk)
provides a certificate of performance in terms of how close the
approximate solution F (yk) is to the optimal solution F (y?)—
that is,
q(yk) ≥ F (yk)− F (y?). (6)
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This gap can be interpreted as the population regret at iteration
k [27].
Algorithm 3 Frank-Wolfe for MDP Congestion Game
Input: `, P , p, N , .
Output: y?.
1: y0 = 0 ∈ R(T+1)×S×A
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , N do
3: ck = `(yk−1)
4: αk = 2k+1
5: pik = BACKWARD INDUCTION(ck, P ) . Alg. 1
6: dk = FORWARD INDUCTION(P, p, pik) . Alg. 2
7: yk = (1− αk)yk−1 + αkdk
8: Stop if q(yk) ≤ 
9: end for
The Frank-Wolfe algorithm leverages the fact that the linear
sub-problems may be solved with cheaper computation com-
plexity, and therefore results in faster convergence. Indeed,
by leveraging dynamic programming solutions for MDPs
(Algorithms 1 and 2), Algorithm 3 has superior computational
efficiency compared to off-the-shelf solvers, especially for
lower precision requirements [28].
We use a fixed step size of αk = 2k+1 in Algorithm 3 to
obtain sub-linear convergence O(1/k). Other step size values
as well as adaptive step sizes also lead to convergence [26].
D. Online Learning Framework for Decision Makers
We interpret the Frank-Wolfe algorithm as a stochastic
policy seeking strategy that guarantees convergence to an MDP
Wardrop equilibrium over repeated game play.
In the repeated game play scenario, each iteration corre-
sponds to a play of the game. The kth iteration (lines 2–9)
describes the policy changes that occur between (k− 1)th and
kth play of the game. Before the start of kth iteration, an oracle
provides ck to the population of decision makers. Then, the
decision makers calculate the optimal marginal policy (line 5)
based on the marginal state-action costs (line 3) from the
previous iteration. Each decision maker then either uses the its
previous policy from iteration k− 1 with probability (1−αk)
or they use the current policy pik determined in line 5 with
probability αk. The population distribution under this policy
assignment into two subpopulations (where assignments are
made uniformly at random) is described in line 7. With the
chosen sequence for αk, convergence to the optimal policy
and population distribution is guaranteed by the convergence
properties of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm as described in the
preceding subsection.
IV. OPTIMAL TOLL SYNTHESIS FOR CONSTRAINT
SATISFACTION
In this section, we formulate toll synthesis as a bilevel opti-
mization problem and show the existence of an optimal tolling
value. We show that when the game designer can modify
decision makers’ state-action costs, design specifications on
the MDP Wardrop equilibrium distribution y can be satisfied.
Furthermore, we show there exist optimal tolling values for
which design specifications are exactly satisfied.
There are design specifications that the game designer must
enforce, which are affine constraints on the population density
y. In practice, affine constraints can appear due to a broad
range of design requirements. For example, in a city’s traffic
network, artificial limits (expressed as linear combinations of
street traffic density) may be imposed in residential areas to
minimize noise. When building investment portfolios, banks
are faced with stochastic returns based on investment ac-
tions [29], but may be legally required to satisfy minimum
thresholds in reserve, which are also affine constraints.
Assumption 2 (Affine State-Action Constraints): The con-
straints imposed on the MDP congestion game can be written
as a finite set of affine functions specified by
C = {y | ∑
t,s,a
Atsa(i)ytsa − b(i) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [I]
}
where A(i) ∈ R(T+1)×S×A, b(i) ∈ R, and [I] is a finite set
of indices corresponding to the affine constraints.
To enforce constraint y ∈ C, we propose the following toll
function:
gi(y) =
τiA(i)
∑
t,s,a
Atsa(i)ytsa − b(i) > 0
0 otherwise
. (7)
Tolls gi(y) are enforced only when the ith constraint becomes
violated, where the toll on time-state-action triplet (t, s, a) is
proportional to both Atsa(i) and the tolling value τi. Tolling
value τi ∈ R+ is a game designer controlled parameter
that determines the severity of penalty for the ith constraint
violation. The toll function changes decision maker’s costs as
¯`= `+
∑
i
τigi. (8)
The game designer must utilize its control τ to enforce
constraints C on the MDP Wardrop equilibrium induced by
¯` in an MDP congestion game. This can be formulated as a
bilevel optimization problem given by
min
τ
IC(y(τ))
s.t. y(τ) ∈ W(τ)
(9)
where W(τ) denotes set of MDP Wardrop equilibria that
correspond to ¯`,
W(τ) = argmin
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`(u)∂u
+
∑
i∈K
τi[
∑
t,s,a
Atsa(i)ytsa − b(i)tsa]+
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p),
(10)
We note that a related problem is the synthesis of a policy
ξ which maps distributions in Y(P, p) to state-action costs,
such that the state-action costs ¯` = ` + ξ induces a Wardrop
equilibrium that satisfies the constraint specifications. The
synthesis of ξ can be thought of as a reverse Stackelberg
game [30]. All possible pairs (τ, g) define the space of allow-
able tolling functions over which the game designer (leader) is
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able to optimize to induce a desirable distribution that satisfies
the given constraints. Indeed, the problem as viewed from
this perspective is a more general ‘toll synthesis’ problem.
Synthesizing mappings ξ is a much more difficult problem and
the typical approach is to parameterize the space of mappings
and then optimize over the parameters.
Given a non-atomic MDP congestion game played by a con-
tinuous population of decision makers, and design constraints
satisfying Assumption 2, we show the existence of an optimal
τ , such that the MDP Wardrop equilibrium corresponding to
costs in (8) satisfies the constraints C.
Theorem 1 (Existence of Optimal Toll): Consider the game
designer’s optimization problem formulated in (9) where the
followings hold: (i) the decision makers’ state-action cost
` satisfies Assumption 1; (ii) the constraint set C satisfies
Assumption 2; and, (iii) the intersection of constraint set C and
Y(P, p) is non-empty. Then, there exists (τ, y(τ)) that solves
the game designer’s optimal toll synthesis problem given
by (9), where y(τ) belongs to constraint set C. Furthermore,
y(τ) is the MDP Wardrop equilibrium induced by state-action
costs ¯` described by (8).
Proof: See Section VIII-A.
Remark 1: In addition to the toll function given by (7),
there exists other toll functions which can guarantee constraint
satisfaction. We refer to [31] for properties of such functions.
In general, the gradients of all exterior penalty functions can
be utilized as toll functions.
Remark 2: The optimal toll threshold τ?i is exactly the
optimal dual variable that corresponds to constraint gi in the
constrained optimization problem given in (A.1).
Under Frank Wolfe-based learning dynamics in Algo-
rithm 3, the penalty cost gi(y) from (7) can be interpreted
as a tolling scheme in the learning process, where the game
designer decides to enforce penalties gi based on last game’s
distribution yk.
Algorithm 4 Online Tolling Framework for Learning MDP
Congestion Game Equilibria
Input: `, P , p, N , , τ .
Output: y?.
1: y0 = 0 ∈ RS×A
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , N do
3: ck = `(yk)
4: for i ∈ [I] do
5: if
∑
t,s,aAtsa(i)ytsa − b(i) > 0 then
6: ck = ck + τ(i)A(i)
7: end if
8: end for
9: pi = BACKWARD INDUCTION(ck, P ) . Alg. 1
10: dk = FORWARD INDUCTION(P, p, pi) . Alg. 2
11: yk = (1− αk)yk−1 + 2k+1dk
12: Stop if q(yk) ≤ 
13: end for
When the ith constraint is violated during the previous
game, ¯`tsa will include toll Atsa(i)τi during the next game
play. Alternatively, when the state constraints are not violated,
¯`
tsa = `tsa during the next game play. Intuitively, the
additional toll discourages decision makers from choosing
ytsa. Theorem 1 shows that there exists an optimal level of
discouragement, such that the constraint y ∈ C is satisfied by
the MDP Wardrop equilibrium.
In (8), it is evident that ¯`, unlike `, is not only a function of
ytsa. However, we note that ¯` still corresponds to an explicit
potential function as shown in the potential game formulation
in (10). Additionally, we note that the tolling scheme in (8) is
dynamic under online learning framework for decision makers,
in the sense that the toll enforced varies between each game
play. In our previous work [6], we proved convergence of an
optimal toll method that does not vary in between game plays.
This constant tolling method can be applied when state-action
costs `tsa are strictly increasing functions of ytsa.
V. TOLL LEARNING DYNAMICS
When implementing Algorithm 4, the optimal tolling value
τ? is assumed to be known a priori. We now consider the
toll design problem: how to adaptively determine the optimal
tolling value that guarantees constraint satisfaction.
We approach this under the assumption that the game
designer does not have access to the state-action cost models
of decision makers, `, and therefore cannot obtain the optimal
tolling value τ? by utilizing offline solvers to solve the
constrained optimization problem (A.1). This is often the case
for traffic networks where the toll setting authority does not
have a model of drivers’ cost function. Instead, we assume the
game designer can interact with an ongoing MDP congestion
game by setting tolls on its state-action costs and observe how
different tolls modify MDP Wardrop equilibrium of the game.
A. Game Designer’s Online Learning Framework
In the game designer’s online learning framework, the
game designer repeatedly sets the toll on an existing MDP
congestion game. Here, we assume that the decision makers
will always converge to an MDP Wardrop equilibrium given
any toll. When the decision making population determines a
MDP Wardrop equilibrium that corresponds to the toll set by
the game designer, the game designer derives a new toll based
on the amount of the constraint violations that occurred in the
equilibrium distribution.
The goal of the game designer is to enforce the constraint set
C on MDP Wardrop equilibrium. To achieve this, we consider
a tolled state-action cost with a population dependent toll and
a dynamic toll which varies between each game play.
¯`
ρ(y) = `(y) + ρ
∑
i
A(i)
(∑
tsa
Atsa(i)ytsa − b(i)
)
+ σ(i)
(11)
where ρ
∑
iA(i)(
∑
tsaAtsa(i)ytsa − b(i)) is a constraint-
based toll function, ρ > 0 is a constant scaling factor of the
toll function, and σ(i) ∈ R(T+1)×S×A+ is a toll value updated
by the game designer.
When ` satisfies Assumption 1, ¯`ρ is the gradient of a
convex potential function for any toll σ(i) ∈ R(T+1)×S×A+ ,
i ∈ [I], that is enforced. The set Wρ(σ) of MDP Wardrop
6 GENERIC COLORIZED JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2017
equilibria induced by state-action costs ¯`ρ is defined as fol-
lows:
Wρ(σ) = argmin
y
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
(
`tsa(u) +
∑
i
σtsa(i)
)
∂u
+
ρ
2
∑
i
(∑
t,s,a
Atsa(i)ytsa − b(i)
)2
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p).
(12)
The online learning framework has a feedback control inter-
pretation as shown in Fig. 1. The process by which decision
makers achieve MDP Wardrop equilibrium is the plantWρ(σ),
a memoryless process that outputs an MDP Wardrop equilib-
rium y that corresponds to state-action costs ¯`ρ. The toll setting
mechanism utilized by the game designer can be analogously
viewed as a feedback controller, H , that updates σ based on
the amount of constraint violation in y. We derive a myopic
Fig. 1: Game designer’s online learning framework as a
feedback control process.
update rule for σ based on the Alternating Direction Method
of Multipliers (ADMM) method. The complete algorithm is
given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 ADMM
Input: `, P , ps, N , , τ0.
Output: τN , yN .
1: for k = 0, 1, . . . , N do
2: yk+1 ∈ Wρ(AT τk + ρATwk)
3: for i ∈ [I] do
4: wk+1(i) = [b(i)−∑
tsa
Atsay
k+1
tsa − 1ρτki ]+
5: if wk+1(i) = 0 then
6: τk+1(i) = τk(i) + ρ(
∑
tsa
Atsa(i)y
k+1 − b(i))
7: else
8: τk+1(i) = 0
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
Theorem 2 (Optimal Toll Estimation): When ` satisfies As-
sumption 1, and C the set of enforced constraints satisfies
Assumption 2, Algorithm 5 asymptotically converges to τ?,
an optimal solution to the bilevel optimization problem (9)
at a rate of O(1/k). Furthermore, the amount of constraint
violation also converges at a rate of O(1/k).
Proof: See Section VIII-B
In the online learning framework, Algorithm 5 has the
following interpretation. The designer first determines the
amount of constraint violation that exists in an MDP Wardrop
equilibrium distribution yk. For any constraint i that is vi-
olated, τk+1(i) is increased by exactly the amount that the
mass-dependent toll function, ρ(Ayk+1 +wk+1− b), incurred
during the last iteration at every time step. When constraint
i is not violated, the toll τ i(k + 1) is set to zero. After each
toll adjustment, the designer announces a toll update, and the
decision makers converge to an MDP Wardrop equilibrium
based on the new toll. Algorithm 5 shows that such a toll
adjustment algorithm will result in convergence of τk to the
optimal tolling value τ?, convergence of yk to the MDP
Wardrop equilbrium of game with state-action costs given
by (11).
Remark 3: Although the constant penalty applied to the
MDP congestion game at iteration k in Algorithm 5 is AT τk+
ρATwk, τk is the parameter that converges to τ?. That is, we
can view wk as an internal variable of the ADMM process.
Remark 4: While Algorithm 5 only provides an estimate
of the optimal tolling value at each finite iteration. Theorem 1
states that any τ > τ? will result in an optimal solution to
the bilevel optimization problem given in (9). This implies
that at the kth iteration of Algorithm 5, we obtain a tolling
value τ which ensures constraint satisfaction for the set of
MDP Wardrop equilibria of game with state-action costs given
by (8), and whose distance to τ? decreases on the order of 1/k.
A natural question is what benefit does greater accuracy in τ
gain. In Fig. 6 in Section VI, we show that greater accuracy in
τ results in a faster convergence rate for the decision makers
when they themselves undergo learning dynamics.
In order to implement Algorithm 5 in an online learning
setting, the game designer does not need an explicit model
of the congestion effects of the decision makers, as long as
the designer can add to the costs of decision makers through
imposing monetary tolls on the relevant links. In this way,
the toll learning dynamics are effectively decoupled from the
state-action cost model utilized by decision makers.
B. Inexact ADMM
In the iterative approach outlined in Algorithm 5, the con-
vergence of τ? and constraint satisfaction require lower level
decision makers to precisely return the Wardrop equilibrium.
In this section, we present convergence results to the case
where the decision makers always approximately solves for
Wardrop equilibrium.
The assumption that decision maker can always determine
exact Wardrop equilibrium is restrictive. In applications on
large-scaled networks, it is often difficult to solve for the
exact solution. In comparison, approximate solutions are often
computationally cheaper to obtain. In using Algorithm 5, an
approximate solution of Wρ may be preferred in Algorithm 5
to an exact solution if it results in a similar level of accuracy in
estimating the optimal tolling threshold τ?. This is especially
true when τk is still far from τ?, where τk+1 may gain a
comparable amount of accuracy from both yk ∈ Wρ(AT τk +
ρATwk) and an approximation of Wρ(AT τk + ρATwk).
Another motivation is considering learning dynamics of
the game designer interacting with decision makers who
are following learning dynamic themselves. In most learning
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dynamics for non-atomic congestion games, decision makers
often asymptotically approach the true MDP Wardrop equilib-
rium [27, 28]. In any finite time, the game designer can only
observe an approximate MDP Wardrop equilibrium. In such
a set up, it is not obvious that the game designer’s learning
dynamics will still converge to the optimal tolling threshold.
In Algorithm 6, we make the assumption that decision
makers are using an iterative method to solve for Wρ. To
measure closeness of an approximation, we consider an  MDP
Wardrop equilibrium.
Definition 2 (–MDP Wardrop Equilibrium): Given p ∈
RT×S×A,  > 0, there exists J < ∞, such that at the J th
iteration, y(J) satisfies∑
tsa
(¯`tsa(y(J))− δtsa)(ytsa(J)− ytsa) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Y(P, p),
where ‖δ‖2 ≤ , and ¯` defined by (11), then y(J) satisfies
–equilibrium at penalty p, denoted by y(J) ∈ Wρ(p, ).
For any y? ∈ Wρ(p), Definition 2 is trivially satisfied.
Additionally, Definition 2 states that any alternative strategy
employed by the decision makers will result in no more than
an  decrease in the cost.
We note that Definition 2 implies the regular additive –
Wardrop equilibrium [32]. From the definition of Wρ(p, ),
we can equivalently show that for any y(J) ∈ Wρ(p, ),∑
tsa
¯`
tsa(y(J))(ytsa(J)− ytsa)
≤
∑
tsa
δtsa(ytsa(J)− ytsa)
≤ Df .
where Df = maxy,y′∈Y(P,p) ‖y − y′‖2 is the diameter of
feasible set Y(P, p).
To show convergence of Algorithm 6, we also assume
strictly increasing costs for the MDP congestion game.
Assumption 3: For each y ∈ Y(P, p), `tsa(ytsa) <∞, and
there exists α > 0 such that
`tsa(y
′
tsa)− `tsa(ytsa) ≥ α(y′tsa − ytsa) if ytsa < y′tsa,
holds for all (t, s, a) ∈ [T + 1]× [S]× [A], y, y′ ∈ Y(P, p).
Under Assumption 3, the corresponding MDP Wardrop equlib-
rium set Wρ(τ) is a singleton for any toll τ . Although it is
possible for decision makers to individually solve for the exact
equilibrium, we note that decision makers are still able to
save significant computation complexity by utilizing learning
dynamics that approximate the equilibrium.
Theorem 3 (Designer-Follower Learning Convergence):
For an MDP congestion game satisfying Assumption 3,
suppose the strategies employed by decision makers converge
asymptotically, such that at each tolling iteration k, the
decision makers’ learning dynamics satisfy
lim
j→∞
y(j) = y?, y? ∈ Wρ(pk).
Then, the game designer’s updates for τk in Algorithm 6 con-
verge when the kth approximate MDP Wardrop equilibrium
Algorithm 6 Approximate ADMM
Input: `, P , ps, N , .
Output: τN , yN .
1: for k = 0, 1, . . . , N do
2: yk+1 ∈ Wρ(AT τk + ρATwk, k)
3: for i ∈ [I] do
4: wk+1(i) = [b(i)−∑
tsa
Atsay
k+1
tsa − 1ρτki ]+
5: if wk+1(i) = 0 then
6: τk+1(i) = τk(i) + ρ(
∑
tsa
Atsa(i)y
k+1
tsa − b(i))
7: else
8: τk+1(i) = 0
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
observed by the game designer satisfies
yk ∈ Wρ(pk, k), lim
k→∞
k = 0.
Furthermore, if yk also converges, (τk, yk) must converge to
an optimal solution of (9).
Proof: See Section VIII-C.
Remark 5: Examples of learning dynamics where the opti-
mal solution converges to limk→ k = 0 are Frank-Wolfe al-
gorithms [6] as well as projected subgradient algorithms [28].
In the Frank-Wolfe case, it is not obvious when the jth
iteration of the decision makers learning dynamics satisfy
y(j) ∈ Wρ(AT τk + ρATwk, k), as the convergence bounds
are given in terms of the potential function.
If approximate solutions to the MDP Wardrop equilibrium
Wρ can be obtained for less computation complexity, Theo-
rem 3 shows that approximations of τ? can also be obtained
for the game designer with less computations. Algorithm 6 is
especially useful for large-scale networks where computing the
exact MDP Wardrop equlibrium can be difficult, but methods
such as Frank Wolfe offer fast convergence to an approximate
equilibria. In the next section, we consider a heuristic for the
finite termination of decision makers’ dynamics based on the
Frank-Wolfe duality gap q(y(j)) defined in (6), and show that
Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 achieve similar convergence
behaviour while the latter is significantly faster, due to the
lack of accuracy required to solve Wρ(pk, k).
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we model competition among ride-sharing
drivers in metro Seattle as an MDP congestion game. Sec-
tion VI-A describes the model and necessary assumptions.
In Section VI-B, we utilize Algorithm 4, Algorithm 5 and
Algorithm 6 to demonstrate how the ride-share company can
enforce tolls to ensure minimum driver density constraints.
A. Ride-sharing Model
Consider a ride-share scenario in metro Seattle, where
rational ride-sharing drivers seek to optimize their profits while
repeatedly working Friday nights. Assume that the demand for
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Fig. 2: State representation of metro Seattle.
riders is constant during the game and for each game play. The
time increment is taken to be 15 minutes, i.e. the average time
for a ride, after which the driver needs to take a new action.
We model the Seattle metro area as an abstract set of states,
s ∈ [S], corresponding to individual neighbourhoods, as shown
in Fig. 2. sj is a neighbouring state of si if a direct route
from si to sj exists without passing through other states. The
following states are characterized as residential: ‘Ballard’ (3),
‘Fremont’ (4), ‘Sand Point’ (8), ‘Magnolia’ (9), ‘Green Lake’
(11), ‘Ravenna’ (12). Assume drivers have equal probabilities
of starting from any of the residential neighbourhoods.
Drivers in the same neighbourhood compete for riders. We
assume that drivers cannot see the rider’s destination before
choosing to picking rider up, nor could he refuse a rider
based his or her destination. From the driver’s perspective,
the rider’s destination is randomly chosen from a uniform
distribution of the neighbouring states. Therefore, the set of
ride-sharing drivers can be modeled by congestion game with
MDP dynamics. At each state s, the following actions are
available to each driver:
• ar: wait for a rider, transition to rider’s destination state.
• asj : transition to an adjacent state sj without waiting for
a rider.
When choosing ar, we assume the driver will eventually pick
up a rider, though it may take more time if there are many
drivers waiting for riders in that neighborhood. As discussed
below, longer wait times decrease the driver’s reward for
choosing ar.
On the other hand, there are two possible scenarios when
drivers choose asj . The driver either drives to sj and pays the
travel costs without receiving a fare, or picks up a rider in si.
We allow the second scenario with a small probability to model
the possibility of drivers deviating from their predetermined
strategy during game play.
We denote by Ni the set of neighbouring states for state
si. The transition probability for state-action pair (s, a) given
current state si is given by
P (s, a, si) =

1
|Ni|+1 , if s ∈ Ni, a = ar
1
|Ni|+1 , if s = si, a = ar
0.1
|Ni| , if s ∈ Ni, s 6= sj , a = asj
0.9, if s ∈ Ni, s = sj , a = asj
0, otherwise
(13)
The reward function for taking each action is given by
`tsa(ytsa) = Es′
[
mts′s − ctravts′s
]− cwaitt · ytsa
=
∑
s′
Pts′sa
[
mts′s − ctravts′s
]− cwaitt · ytsa
where mts′s is the monetary cost for transitioning from state
s to s′, ctravts′s is the travel cost from state s to s
′, cwaitt is
the coefficient of the cost of waiting for a rider. We estimate
various parameters in (14) as
mts′s =
(
Rate
) · (Dist) (14a)
ctravts′s = τ
(
Dist
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
(
Vel
)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
hr/mi
+
(
Fuel
Price
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
$/gal
(
Fuel
Eff
)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
gal/mi
(
Dist
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
(14b)
cwaitta =

τ ·
(
Customer
Demand Rate︸ ︷︷ ︸
rides/hr
)−1
, if a = ar
δtsas′ , if a = a
′
s
(14c)
where δtsas′ is the mild congestion effect from of drivers who
all decide to traverse from s to s′, which we take to be 0.01
throughout the rest of this section. Parameter τ is quantifies
the time-money tradeoff, computed as
Rate ·Dave
Time Step
where the average trip length, Dave, is equivalent to the
average distance between neighbouring states.
The values independent of specific transitions are listed
in the Tab. I. Distance is the geophysical distance between
neighbourhoods.
Rate Velocity Fuel Price Fuel Eff τ Dave
$6 /mi 8 mph $2.5/gal 20 mi/gal $27 /hr 1.25 mi
TABLE I: Parameters for the driver cost function.
B. Ensuring Minimum Driver Density
To ensure rider satisfaction for a neighbourhood with high
fluctuation in rider demand during the later time steps, the
ride-share company aims for a minimum driver coverage of∑
a∈[A] ytsa ≥ 10 in ‘Belltown’, s = 7,
gt(y) = 10−
∑
a
ytsa, ∀t ∈ {3, . . . , T}, s = 7 (15)
The ride-share company must determine the optimal toll to
charge to ensure that the resulting MDP Wardrop equilibrium
satisfies the constraints while maximizing their own profits.
Assuming that the company does not have a model of its
drivers state-action costs, the optimal toll problem can be ex-
pressed under the game designer’s online learning framework:
the ride-share company must adaptively determine neigh-
bourhood tolls based on how drivers’ population distribution
changes in response to different tolls.
In the interaction with drivers who are the decision makers
of the game, we consider two different scenarios: when the
drivers themselves undergo learning dynamics, such that only
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approximate MDP Wardrop equilibrium can be returned in
finite time (Algorithm 6) versus when drivers can solve for
and form an exact MDP Wardrop equilibrium in finite time
(Algorithm 5). We utilize Algorithm 4 to return approximate
MDP Wardrop equilibriums of an toll set by the company, and
solve optimization problem (12) with CVXPY [33] directly to
simulate when drivers do reach MDP Wardrop equilibrium in
finite time. We compare both solutions against the baseline
solution we obtain with CVXPY by solving the bilevel opti-
mization problem (9).
Although Algorithm 6 requires an  bound on the approx-
imate MDP Wardrop equilibrium in solving the sub-problem
in line 2, such a bound does not cannot be explicitly related to
the termination criteria for Algorithm 4. Instead we introduce
the following heuristic used in lieu of the original termination
criteria,
q(y(j)) =
∑
t,s,a
(ytsa(j)− dtsa(j))`tsa(y(j)) ≤ k, (16)
where q(y(j)) bounds population regret of Frank Wolfe (Al-
gorithm 5), and dtsa(j) is an internal parameter of the Frank
Wolfe algorithm defined in Algorithm 4, line 6.
We run Algorithm 6 with k = 1000k+1 , and ρ = 1. The
convergence of Lρ and optimal tolling threshold τ? for both
Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are shown in Fig. 3. As
expected, Algorithm 5 has a sublinear convergence rate in
both MDP congestion game’s objective value and the optimal
tolling threshold. Algorithm 6 does not have any convergence
guarantees, however from comparison with Algorithm 5, we
observe that it has the same rate of convergence on the optimal
tolling threshold, and even slightly better rates of convergence
in terms of population regret.
10−3
10−2
10−1
‖L
k ρ
−L
? ρ
‖
‖L
? ρ
‖
0 25 50 75 100
Iterations
10−1
6× 10−2
‖τ
k
−τ
?
‖
‖τ
?
‖
Fig. 3: Convergence of population regret and toll value by
utilizing Algorithm 5 (orange) and Algorithm 6 (blue).
The amount of constraint violation for both algorithms
are shown in Fig. 4. During the toll estimation process, we
observe that the amount of constraint violation monotonically
approaches 0 at similar rates for both algorithms. However,
Algorithm 5 has significantly less constraint violation than
Algorithm 6.
0 50 100
Iterations
100
101
102
‖A
y
−
b‖
2
Fig. 4: Constraint violation during game designer’s learning
process for Algorithms 5 (orange) and 6 (blue).
With the estimated τ? from Algorithm 6, we can apply
optimal tolling Algorithm 4 for tolling parameters τ > τ?.
We utilize toll function as in (7). Convergence behaviour of
primal objective for five different tolling values is shown in
Fig. 5. The toll applied in each data set is τ = kτ?, where k is
0 100 200 300 400 500
Iterations
10−2
10−1
100
|L¯
k
−L
?
|
L
?
2.0
1.6
1.36
1.216
1.1296
Fig. 5: Online learning of MDP congestion game equilibria
using Algorithm 4 and the estimated optimal toll value from
Algorithm 6. Each data set corresponds to utilizing tolling
value τ = kτN , where k is the number in the legend and τN
corresponds to the result of Algorithm 6.
given by the legend shown. We see that the convergence rate
improves when τ is closer to τ?, which motivates obtaining
an accurate estimate of the optimal tolling value.
The population density as a function of time for the
constrained state s = 7 that results from Algorithm 4 is
shown in Fig. 6a in green, where we use a tolling value
of 1.0625τ? and run the algorithm for 500 iterations, the
optimal tolling value used is as derived using Algorithm 6. We
compare the distribution to the optimal unconstrained density
shown in blue, and the constrained MDP Wardrop equilibrium
distribution as solved by CVXPY, shown in orange. Because
Algorithm 4 produces a population distribution that asymptot-
ically approaches the constrained MDP Wardrop equilibrium,
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Fig. 6: Applying the result of Algorithm 5 with ρ = 1.0 to
a cost augmented MDP congestion game and comparing its
optimal mass distribution
we note that after 500 iterations, the population density is close
to but does not satisfy the imposed constraints.
In Fig. 6b, we compare the primal objective achieved for
the unconstrained MDP Wardrop equilibrium (uCVX), the
constrained equilibrium (cCVX), and approximate equilibrium
achieved using Algorithm 4 after 500 iterations (eFW). After
500 iterations, Algorithm 4 returns a population distribution
whose potential value is significantly reduced from the uncon-
strained potential.
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10−1
100
101
T
im
e(
se
c)
Fig. 7: Time comparison of exact (orange) and inexact solu-
tions (blue). X-axis is the iteration number, y-axis is time used
at this iteration.
Finally, in Fig. 7, we see that Algorithm 6 is much more
efficient computationally in comparison to Algorithm 5 for the
same accuracy. We simulate both algorithms for increasing ac-
curacy in toll estimation τk. In Algorithm 5, line 2, each MDP
Wardrop equilibriumW(τ?) is computed using CVXPY. Since
the potential game optimization formulation (5) has the same
structure for all iterations, CVXPY consistently solves it in
≈ 20 seconds. In Algorithm 6, the MDP Wardrop equilibrium
at iteration k is approximated by using Algorithm 4, which
terminates at iteration j when q(yk(j)) ≈ 0.001k Lc where Lc
is a scaling factor taken to be the primal objective value of
the constrained MDP Wardrop equilibrium, as we obtained
in Fig. 6b under column cCVX. Since q(yk) decreases sub-
linearly in k, we see that the number of iterations j that
Algorithm 4 requires to satisfy such a bound also increases
sub-linearly. Despite the increase in solving time at each
iteration k, Algorithm 6 is still significantly more efficient than
Algorithm 5, especially given that the two algorithms result in
similar levels of accuracy in optimal toll estimation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed how to satisfy given state
constraints of an MDP congestion game. We provided an
online learning interpretation of the Frank Wolfe algorithm
for decision makers, as well as present an online learning
interpretation of ADMM to determine the optimal tolling value
corresponding to a set of design constraints. Future directions
involve extending the ADMM algorithm to the distributed
scenario by considering its convergence properties when each
decision maker can only receive partial information about
state-action costs at each game iteration.
VIII. APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide detailed proofs of Theorem 1,
Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 presented in the main body.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The decision makers play an MDP congestion game with
state-action costs given by (8), resulting in optimal distribution
set which solves the optimization problem in (10). The objec-
tive of the optimization problem in (10) can be decomposed
into a potential function due to the original cost and a con-
straint dependent function Gi(y) = τi[
∑
t,s,aAtsa(i)ytsa −
b(i)]+ which satisfies
Gi(y)
{
= 0 y ⊆ C
> 0 y 6⊆ C.
By construction, G(y) is a continuous exterior penalty func-
tion relative to C. When we take the limit of τi → ∞,
Gi(y) becomes an indicator function. The potential game
formulation of MDP congestion games would be equivalent
to the following constrained optimization problem:
W = argmin
ytsa
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`tsa(u) ∂u
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p),
y ∈ C.
(A.1)
When Y(P, p)∩C 6= ∅, the optimization problem in (A.1) has a
non-empty solution set. From the exact penalty theorem [34,
Prop. 5.4.5], there exists a finite τ? for which if τ > τ?,
W(τ) = W . Finally we observe that for all (τ, y(τ)) such
that τ > τ?, IC(y(τ)) = 0 therefore (τ, y(τ)) solves game
designer’s toll synthesis problem given by (9) when τ > τ?.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In the proof of Theorem 1, we showed that when τ > τ?,
the bilevel optimization problem (9) is solved by (y?, τ)
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where (y?, τ?) is a primal-dual solution pair to the constrained
optimization given by
argmin
ytsa
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`tsa(u) ∂u (A.2a)
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p), (A.2b)
y ∈ C, (A.2c)
where the dual parameter τ? is the optimal dual parameter
corresponding to constraint (A.2c).
When ` satisfies non-decreasing property in Assumption 1
and C satisfies Assumption 2, (A.2a)–(A.2c) form a convex
optimization problem. To iteratively solve for the optimal
threshold τ?, we consider using the convex optimization
algorithm ADMM [35], by first noting that (A.2) is equivalent
to an equality constrained optimization given by
min
y,w
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`tsa(u) ∂u+ IR+(w)
s.t. y ∈ Y(P, p),
A(i)y + w(i) = b(i), ∀ i ∈ [I].
(A.3)
We use the following variable updates [35]:
yk+1 = argmin
y∈Y
Lρ(y, w
k, τk),
wk+1 = argmin
w∈RI+
Lρ(y, w
k, τk),
and
τk+1(i) = τk(i) + ρ
(∑
tsa
Atsa(i)y
k+1
tsa − b(i) + wk+1(i)
)
,
by defining the augmented Lagrangian,
Lρ(y, w, τ) =
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
`tsa(u) ∂u
+
∑
i
τk(i)(
∑
tsa
Atsa(i)ytsa + w
k(i)− b(i))
+
ρ
2
∥∥∥∥∥∑
tsa
Atsa(i)ytsa + w
k(i)− b(i)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
(A.4)
Updates for wk and τk can be shown to be equivalent to
lines 4–9 in Algorithm 5. In particular, the update for wk+1
is the analytical solution to argminw∈RI+ Lρ(y, w
k, τk). The
update for yk+1 is equivalent to finding an MDP Wardrop
equilibrium for a game played with state-action costs given
by (11) when σ(i) = τk(i) + ρwk(i).
Convergence of ADMM for constrained optimization prob-
lems (A.3) with convex objective is O(1/k) [36].
C. Proof of Theorem 3
When yk ∈ Wρ(AT (τk+ρwk), k), from the variational in-
equality characterization for convex minimization, there exists
a δk ∈ RT×S×A, ∥∥δk∥∥ < k such that
δk − ¯`(yk) ∈ NY(P,p)(yk),
where NY(P,p)(yk) denote the normal cone with respect to
Y(P, p) at yk [37, Thm 2A.6]. Equivalently,
δk ∈ ∂y
(
Lρ(y, τ
k, wk) + IY(y)
)
|y=yk ,
where Lρ(y, w, τ) is defined in (A.4), such that ¯`(y) is its
gradient, and IY is the indicator function with respect to the
feasible set, whose sub-differential at yk is the normal cone.
Since Lρ(y, w, τ) is strongly convex in y under Assump-
tion 3, convergence of Algorithm 6 to τ? and conditional
convergence to y? follows from [38, Prop.1].
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